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DIRECTORATE OF
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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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
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South Vietnam: The Vietnamese Communists have staked out a formal claim to a share of political power in South Vietnam by setting up a provisional regime as a rival to the Saigon government.

The step was announced in a series of broadcasts by the Viet Cong's Liberation Radio on 10 June. It was billed as an outgrowth of consultations between the Liberation Front and the other major Communist front, the Alliance, but it probably was an integral part of the Communist program which began unfolding on 8 May with the Front's ten-point proposal for ending the war.

The new "government" probably is designed both to rally support from forces in South Vietnam opposing the Thieu government and as a device for asserting Communist authority in an interim period leading up to new general elections. It seems to be directly linked to the passage in the Front's program which specifies that during this period "neither party shall impose its political regime on the people of South Vietnam."

The personnel in the cabinet and the advisory council announced by the Liberation Front radio appear to be drawn largely from well-known figures in the Front and the Alliance.

* * * *

Ground fighting picked up sharply on 9-10 June with the heaviest action taking place in I and III corps.]

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More than 200 Communist troops were killed in three battles in Quang Nam Province and another 100 died during engagements in two provinces near Saigon. Most of this ground action developed from allied initiatives. An upsurge in enemy shellings during the same period, however, underscored Communist hopes of keeping up a credible show of strength through the current so-called offensive phase. [REDACTED]
(Map) [REDACTED]

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Brazil: [The government's efforts to prevent incidents that could mar Governor Rockefeller's visit may in fact be increasing hostility toward his mission.]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The police appear frequently unable, however, to differentiate between possible terrorists and outspoken student opponents of the government. This lack of discrimination, and the security forces' occasional brutality in dealing with detained students, are focusing student hostility on the visit. Students have scheduled a general university strike and agitation from now until 16 June to demonstrate opposition to the government and in hopes of frustrating and tiring security forces prior to the mission's visit. [Last night students attacked a USIS library in Rio de Janeiro destroying a number of books but apparently causing little other damage. They also distributed leaflets protesting the Rockefeller visit.]

[The government's heavy-handedness has now been extended to the communications media. The Justice Ministry issued a circular on 7 June prohibiting any reporting on--among many other subjects--hostile acts against the Rockefeller mission in other countries on its itinerary, or the possibility of postponement or cancellation of its trip to Brazil. The circular also "recommended" that the media collaborate to create a climate favorable to the success of the visit.]

[The greatest potential danger probably comes not from student protesters but from small, trained terrorist groups which might take this opportunity to attack US installations or the Governor's party. The government is determined to prevent such action, but its record against the well-organized terrorist groups has not been impressive.] [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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
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Chile: A police search of the University of Concepcion has given President Frei still another problem.

Leftist parties have charged that police violated university autonomy--although Chilean law does not specify that universities are autonomous. The search was initiated after a newspaper editor charged that leftist students--specifically members of the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left--had kidnaped and maltreated him. The university has been a base for terrorist activity by that movement, and the searchers found a large quantity of extremist propaganda and materials for molotov cocktails in the headquarters of the student federation.

Left-wing congressmen from Frei's Christian Democratic Party may seize on the outcry against the police action as an excuse to join the opposition in the motion of censure now pending against Minister of Interior Perez Zujovic, whose hard-line policies are coming under heavy criticism. If he should be censured by both houses, he would be under a moral but not a legal obligation to resign.



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
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South Korea: The confidence of opponents of a third term for President Pak is growing.

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about 30 government assemblymen are solidly against an amendment that would remove the constitutional ban on a third term. The regime would need the support of virtually all of its ruling party assemblymen to pass the amendment.

Most of the rebels within the party reportedly believe that they have been identified by Pak's supporters and have no hope of being renominated by the party for the assembly in 1971 if the third term amendment carries. Thus, even though pressures, including physical intimidation, will be great, they believe they have no choice but to hold their ground.

Leaders of the major opposition party are also confident that the amendment will be defeated. The opposition party made an unusual show of unanimity at its annual convention in May, a situation undoubtedly brought about by anticipation of the upcoming fight over the amendment. The party's Antiamendment Struggle Committee has already set up 50 district branches and plans to start speech campaigns in June. In addition, the committee is recruiting college students to stage sit-down protests in front of the National Assembly and ruling party headquarters in June. At a press conference on 10 June which was given headline coverage in all the Seoul papers, the president of the opposition party pledged "every means" to block the amendment.

Supporters of Pak have been predicting victory for the amendment. The ruling party's secretary general told the press on 3 June that the government would have more than enough votes when the amendment goes before the assembly. The regime is, however, exerting great efforts to limit the public impact

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of opposition politicians and is closely monitoring and restricting activities of students and intellectuals.

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Pak has not yet publicly committed himself on the constitutional change and is unlikely to do so until he is assured of nearly unanimous party support.

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
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Finland-USSR: Helsinki has announced its decision to begin negotiations with the USSR for the purchase of its first nuclear power plant, but no date has yet been set for the talks.

Construction of the plant has been the subject of heated debate since 1965. Several times the government has asked both the USSR and Western countries for bids, but on each occasion has canceled its plans because of pressures from Moscow not to accept the Western bids, even though they were lower and technically preferable. The Finns declined to consider any Soviet bid until agreement had been reached on a Western-style bilateral treaty on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; such a treaty was finally signed on 14 May of this year. The Finns now plan to tackle serious differences with the Russians over safety requirements in plant construction.

According to current speculation, negotiations will begin in August, but widespread Finnish opposition to the purchase may lead to a delay. The final purchase will not be arranged until the negotiations end, perhaps in 1970.

Finland has made clear that it wants to acquire additional nuclear plants from the West. It will, however, delay placing any orders until the conclusion of a bilateral treaty with the US on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This treaty would ensure fuel supplies for reactors from third countries, such as Sweden.



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
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India-Nepal: No progress appears to have been made in the latest attempt to alleviate strains in Indo-Nepalese relations.

Indian Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh's five-day official visit to Nepal ended Monday, apparently without resolving any of the irritants that have caused relations to decline to their lowest point in recent years. Outstanding issues include a dispute over a small piece of land on the Indo-Nepalese border and dissatisfaction over trade and transit procedures.

A more sensitive issue from the Indian standpoint is Nepal's persistent request that Indian personnel be withdrawn from the 17 or 18 jointly manned checkpoints on the Nepalese side of the border with Tibet. Katmandu strongly objects to the Indian role in the checkpoint operation, [REDACTED] but its main purpose in raising the issue may be in hopes of extracting concessions from India. In particular, it seeks an easing of regulations against the sale of certain Nepalese-manufactured goods in India. New Delhi tends to discount the Nepalese argument that Communist China is applying heavy pressure in Katmandu for the Indian withdrawal.

Details on the lengthy bargaining sessions are unknown, but Singh apparently did not make any conciliatory gestures. His exposure to Nepalese views, however, may eventually lead to more responsive Indian action. The Nepalese foreign minister has accepted Singh's invitation to visit India for further consultations.



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NOTES

USSR - Middle East: Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrived in Cairo on 10 June, presumably to discuss the next step in the search for a political settlement in the Middle East. The Soviets and the Egyptians have held many high-level discussions at the ambassadorial level since last month, while the four powers in New York have been preparing recommendations for UN emissary Jarring's future efforts. On his last trip to Cairo from 21-24 December 1968, Gromyko won Egyptian approval of the Soviet "peace plan" presented to the US on 30 December.

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Nigeria: The federal air force appears determined to stop the vulnerable nightly arms airlift to Biafra, which is the secessionists' only channel for war materiel. About half the aircraft used for relief flights have been grounded since 5 June when a federal MIG-17 shot down a Red Cross plane. Arms flights, however, have continued at a slightly reduced rate. Nigeria does not have the capability to intercept all flights going into Biafra, but continued attacks by the MIG-17s could cause a further reduction in arms deliveries and might well force still more cutbacks in relief flights.

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Syria - Communist China: The Chinese apparently did not offer significant military aid to the Syrian Army chief of staff during his visit to Peking late last month. The Syrians are considering purchasing Chinese military radio equipment, but they are also negotiating with several Western electronics companies for similar equipment. Damascus is likely to continue to rely on the USSR as its major source of military supplies.

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Southern Yemen: [] The army is reportedly disturbed over President Qahtan al-Shaabi's increasingly leftist tendencies. []

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[] the army, which is drawn from moderate tribal elements, is said to fear that Qahtan al-Shaabi may make undesirable political commitments to the leftist regimes he is visiting in North Korea and Syria. The army is also reported to be pressing for restrictions on local leftist activities. Qahtan's cousin, Faysal al-Shaabi, who is also the prime minister, may be encouraging the disaffection in the army in the hope of gaining the presidency for himself in the event Qahtan is ousted. []

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